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NEW STRATEGIES FOR COMBATING CRIME
IN NEW YORK CITY
William J. Bratton*

Good evening, Thank You. It is a real pleasure to be here with
you this evening to talk about something that I spend a lot of time
thinking about: how to make the City of New York a safer place.
This evening's presentation, I hope, will be informative.
Before talking about why crime is down in New York City, and
the national debate that is currently underway as to why it is down
in New York and many other areas around the country, I think it is
important to take a walk back through time to understand how we
got to this point in time. A city that was once frequently cited as
being the crime capital of the world' now has a singular honor and
status as the nation's leading entity in the decline of crime.2 This is
a very significant turn-around in a two to three year period of time.
I have been in policing now for about twenty-five years. Born
and raised in Boston, I joined the Boston Police Department in
1970. During that twenty-five year period of time, there has been
several very significant change in American policing. I entered policing during the beginning of one phase and now, after twenty-five
years, I find myself in a leadership position as another phase is taking hold. Of the two phases, I think the current phase is going to
be the more productive and the more successful.
1970. America. The Vietnam War was still raging. Huge demonstrations. We had just come through the race riots of the sixties,
the Civil Rights Movement, and we were at the beginning of a
* Commissioner, New York Police Department, January 1994-April 1996. These
remarks were delivered at a lecture at Fordham University School of Law on January

31, 1996. Mr. Bratton is currently with First Security Services Corp.
1. Howard Kurtz, Scribe Bids New York Trash Farewell,WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
1990 at W12 ("Washington may have higher per-capita murder rate, but New York is,
hands-down, the weird-crime capital of the world."); Robert Friedman, Living in Fear:
1 of 2 is a Victim of Crime; City Losing the War on all Fronts, NEWSDAY, Aug. 13,
1989, at 5 ("The perception of New York as the crime capital of the world is hardly
new."); Ellis Henican, City Takes Beating Over Attack, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1989, at 25
("For as long as anyone can remember, New York City has been known as a crime
capital . .

").

2. Eric Pooley, One Good Apple, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 54; Take Regional Approach to Solve City's Problems, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Jan. 17, 1996, at B6 ("New York
City, leading the nation in reducing crime, added 5,000 community police to its
32,000-person police force.").
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more permissive society.3 American policing was moving into a
new era-the professional policing era. We were going to take advantage of emerging technology, for example, the 911 system, computer-aided dispatch, and the increasing use of motorized patrol.
The era was, I think, best emphasized by the old Jack Webb Dragnet Badge 714 series. The professional police officer-just the
facts; no personality; no personal touch, if you will. Just the facts,
man, just the facts. The era is best characterized by the three Rs
and three P's. I will be talking about three Rs and three P's during
the presentation. With my Boston accent the "R" may sound a
little funny to you, so I apologize for that. (laughter)
The three Rs. What were they? What was the policing style of
the 1970s that was going to be the end-all of policing, the professional era that was going to control crime and keep it reduced after
the turbulent sixties and early seventies? One was the concept of
rapid response. Those 911 calls, that allowed us to take police off
walking posts and into cars so they could rapidly respond to the
growing number of calls that 911 was creating. The second concept
was the idea of random patrol. When not on calls, these cars would
be preventing and deterring crime. Because of the random nature
of the patrol, the police-driven cars could cover large areas. The
third element was the Jack Webb type of reactive investigation after the crime occurred. The theme of that type of policing was
largely reactive. Think of it, reacting to 911 calls, random patrol,
riding, around waiting for something to happen-hoping that you
are preventing things from happening-and the reactive
investigation.
What happened, however, was that type of policing was ill-prepared for the large volume of calls that was generated by 911.
Most major American cities were overwhelmed as other city services were declining and police became the catch-all. Dial 911 and,
like the fire department, we were the two that would always come.
We were overwhelmed by it. So there was less and less time for
man to patrol, more and more time chasing all those incidents, less
and less time to solve the problems that were causing all those incidents. With more and more calls, and more and more crime being
generated during the Seventies and Eighties, there was less time to
investigate, less clearance, and less solving of crime. So, when we
entered the turbulent 1980s, American police forces were very ill3. See generally William J. Bennett, What's Wrong with America: Spiritual Decline Harms Nation, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, May 8, 1994, at F1 (comparing
the differences of societal permissiveness in the 1970s with today).
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prepared to deal with what began to occur. There were drugs, particularly cocaine, and then the emergence of crack-cocaine around
1984-85. 4 And with crack-cocaine came guns, increasingly more
powerful weapons, the nine millimeter semi-automatic, with fifteen, seventeen rounds instead of the old zip gun or the old thirtyeight with five or six. 5 Then there was the new element that scared
the hell out of everybody. That is the increasing involvement of
youth in that drug-related, gun-involved violence and the element
of random violence.6 In what we once thought were safe areas of
our cities arose the random nature of crime. When New York experienced this particularly in the late Eighties and early Nineties, it
began to scare everybody. American police forces really were not
prepared for it. We were not prepared for it. We are an incidentoriented, reactive type of profession.
Fortunately, in the late 1970s, early 1980s, a number of police
leaders, academics, criminologists, and political types began to
think about what we could do differently. Clearly, what we were
doing was not working. From that evolved the concept of community policing. It began all over the country in little bits and pieces
here and there, culminating in a process at Harvard University
where, with a federal grant over a several-year period of time, police leaders, academics and political types came together to talk
about the issues.7 Ultimately from that came the concept of community policing.
. Community Policing. You hear a lot about it. We now have an
office in Washington that is there to dispense millions of dollars to
support the concept.8 But what is it? Well, the definition of it is
still very much in debate. I am going to give you my definition of
4. See, e.g., Philip Hagar, Drug Cases Now Dominate Caseloads of Urbanite
Courts, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 1990, at 1 ("[I]n the five years after 1983, adult felony

arrests for non-marijuana drug offenses rose... [to] a startling increase that closely
parallels the emergence of crack-cocaine . . ."). See also Eric Lichtblan & Gaylord
Shaw, Problem in 46 States: It's Not Just a 'City Drug', Apr. 5, 1988, at 1 ("[In] late
1985, crack became a big problem in New York City.").

5. See id ("[L]aw enforcement officers across the country have detected a quantum leap in the arsenals of drug dealers ....
Israeli-made machine guns, known as
Uzis, American-made machine guns, known as Mac-10's, a variety of sawed-off shot

guns, ... 'every kind of hand gun you can imagine.' " (quotation omitted)).
6. See id. (describing incidents of violence in the nation's cities involving youngsters and drug-related activities).
7. See Brian McGrory, Community Policing as Bold Plan, THE BOSTON GLOBE,

Jan. 16, 1992, at 1.
8. See Marjorie Lambert, State Getting Big Share of Crime Bill Aid, SUN-SENTINEL FT. LAUDERDALE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 1B ("[The] Violent Crime Control and Law

Enforcement Act of 1994 provides for a federal grant system to hire, train and equip
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it. Joe Brown9 and I, on our way up in the car were talking about
it. We have different definitions of it and that is symptomatic of
people trying to come to grips with what is community policing?
Why is community policing so good? And what is it going to do?
Quite simply, it is the three P's. Remember the three Rs? Well
community policing, in its simplest form is three P's. It is the concept of partnership. In the 1970s and 1980s, police said, "Give us
money, give us equipment, give us cops, we will take care of your
problems." And it just did not happen. The problems overwhelmed even those police departments that were adequately
staffed, and many of them were not during the 1970's and 1980's.
So we were not prepared to do it alone.
But community policing says let us work together; You; the
community; the other institutions of government; and the other entities in the criminal justice system. Let us work in partnership and
with our united numbers, maybe, we can have impact. What are
we going to work on? We have finally come to recognize, after
chasing all those hundreds of thousands of 911 calls in the 1970s
and 1980s, that those calls were only symptoms of problems. After
going back time and again to kick the kids off the corner or going
back time and again for that husband and wife fighting with each
other, and each time seeing the problem escalate we realized that
we were not taking effective action to solve the problem that was
generating all those calls. Community policing said let us look at
the issue differently. What can we do to deal with that husband
and wife whose constant fighting eventually escalates into assaults
and the kids on the comer whose drinking eventually escalates into
the equivalents of guns and knives, assaults, random shootings and
more violence.
In addition to working in partnership to deal with problems, the
other focus, of community policing was something the American
police forces and the criminal justice system lost sight of in the
1970s and 1980s: the basic reason for our being. The reason that
police were created was to prevent crime. We are here to prevent
crime, to reduce it where we can, but more importantly, to prevent
it. What is effectively going on in the 1990s in many American
cities, and I will speak very specifically now about New York, is not
doing away with the three Rs. We can not get rid of 911. Yesterday we just unveiled a $150 million enhanced 911 system that alnew officers for community policing programs. States and local police agencies are
eligible.")
9. Joseph Brown, Director of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS).
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lows us to see the address and phone number the calls are coming
from.1" So, 911 is here to stay. We can not do away with random
patrol of cops and cars. We need them to respond to those 911
calls. And we definitely can not do away with reactive investigation. There is always going to be crime, and there will always be a
need to investigate it as part of the way we would attempt to investigate it in the future. Rather, we are attempting to blend those
three with the new concept of partnership, problem-solving and
prevention.
What are we doing in New York to implement community policing? My predecessors Lee Brown and Ray Kelly are New Yorkers.
They are very familiar with the safe streets initiative. They are
very familiar with the 1990 headlines in The New York Post, "Do
Something Dave"" and the front cover of Time Magazine, "The
Rotten Apple"' 2 pointing out all the things wrong with New York
City at that time. The negative image of a city seemingly out of
control, or going out of control. If you think back over the previous twenty years, as a result of the corruption scandals in the 1970s,
the city consciously opted to remove its police from dealing with
anything with potential for corruption. Police were precluded
from entering licensed premises and from acting on many street
conditions, for fear of corruption. The result of these restrictions
were that the New York Police withdrew from the streets of New
York, went into their cars, and were satisfied with chasing 911 calls.
Street conditions worsened resulting from a combination of police
inaction and governmental indifference. The first time graffiti was
put up on a wall in New York some place back in the 1960s, this
very liberal city immediately described it as some form of artgraffiti art.13 It was celebrated and encouraged to the extent that,
by 1970, there was no subway car in the city that was not a roving
art form. Then other things began to happen. There was progressive panhandling as the homeless types of situations became more
prevalent and joblessness increased. There existed a sense of a
10. For a description of the "new" 911 system, see Vivian S. Toy, Enhanced 911
System is Online Citywide, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1996, at B3.
11. See Alan Friedman, New York's Decay Outpaces 'Do Nothing' Dinkins, THE
FINANCIAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at 6 (" 'Do Something Dave' screamed a recent

headline in the New York Post...").
12. See id. ("[aind last month a cover story in Tune Magazine ('The Rotten Big
Apple')

. .1-

13. See Abstract, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1972, at 25 ("M.F. Donaldson ... contends
[that] graffiti is the primitive pop art of inarticulate people looking for recognition.").
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permissive society allowing certain things that would not have been
tolerated many years ago.
I can recall my first visit to New York in 1990 when I was being
recruited to come down as Chief of the Transit Police from Boston.
Many of you have visited Boston. Most New Yorkers think of it as
"that great place up north." It is a beautiful city. It does not seem
to have a lot of the problems of many major cities, definitely not on
the scale of what New York is experiencing. But in 1990 I can recall coming in from the airport, flying into LaGuardia, and coming
down that highway. It looked like something out of a futuristic
movie in terms of graffiti on every highway wall, dirt on rubber
tires that look like they have not been cleaned in years, burned-out
cars, litter everywhere. "Welcome to New York!" Then when you
reach the first stoplight in New York City, you see the official
greeter for the City of New York. You know the guy out there in
baggy dirty clothes with a rag. Or the more sophisticated would
actually have a squeegee. Sometimes even with the squeegee they
manage to scratch up your window. But that was a sense of how
the city had stopped caring about itself. Then we came down Fifth
Avenue, the very famous mile, if you will. There were unlicensed
peddlers everywhere, and also dirt and filth everywhere. Then
there were the subways. Upstairs was heaven, then you get to
those subways. Incredible. I can remember going through the first
turnstile array and watching people leap over turnstiles, crawl
under them, anything but pay the fare. Every platform seemed to
have a cardboard city on either end of it where the homeless had
taken up residence. This was a city that had really lost control of
its city and its subways. The turnaround in the last five or six years
has been phenomenal considering what it looked like then, how it
looks now and how it might look in the future.
In any event, into the 1990s Mayor Dinkins and the City Council, with the active support of the public, put through a process
which allowed the hiring of 7,000 additional police in the three police departments along with an array of social agency enhancements and improvements. 14 This was all designed to support Lee
Brown's vision of a community policing initiative in the City of

14. See generally Todd S. Purdum, Dinkins in Accord on FinancialPlanfor Hiring

Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1990 at Al ("Mayor David N. Dinkins and the New York
City Council reached an agreement yesterday on a compromise anti-crime plan for
hiring thousands of new police officers.").
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New York. 15 The focus would be on the three Ps, but its emphasis
would be on 1500 beats throughout the city staffed by about 7,000
new young police officers who were going to go forth into the
streets of New York to solve the problems of New York City. But
when I came down in 1994, aware of the complexities of this great
city, conscious of some of its limitations, and having watched the
department for two years while the Chief of Transit, I changed very
much the direction of the community policing initiative. I
refocused the effort from concentrating on those 7,000 young men
and women to the 76 precinct commanders.
Why the change in focus? Think about it. The average kid coming onto the New York City Police Department at that time was 22
years old. 16 So of the 16,000 cops that you see in the streets of New
York, the average age is 22. You only had to be twenty to join the
NYPD, have a high school education on average or a G.E.D.
Many never held a job until they became New York City Police
Officers. Many had never driven a car until they became New
York City Police Officers. Many, from Long Island, never had any
interaction with a minority person until they found themselves assigned in Harlem, driving a car for the first time in their life, some
not old enough to buy a drink legally in the City of New York. This
was the individual we were going to count on to solve all those
problems. That person was lucky enough that they could follow
the six months of instructions we gave them in the academy and
report to their first assignment. Recognizing that this is an incredibly politically connected and involved city with its political power
and strong community involvement, we were setting these young
men and women up for failure. They could not compete with all
the people who wanted to get into the game to deal with the
problems. We also have a phenomenally large bureaucracy. In a
department of 38,000 cops and 6,000 civilians, 17 the beat police
were very little fish in a very big sea who were not going to be
heard. So, recognizing that, one of the fundamental changes was to
immediately change the focus of the problem-solving from that
young officer to a more mature, fifteen years on average, college

15. For a discussion of Brown's "vision," see Crime and Management: An Interview with New York City Police CommissionerLee D. Brown, HARV. Bus. REv., May/
June 1991, at 339.
16. Statistics provided by the New York Police Department, Bureau of Public
Relations.
17. See Pooley, supra note 2, at 54.
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educated, veteran police commander who knew how to police the
city.
Now, what else did we change in the New York City Police Department to arrive at the point in time we are now in 1996? Overall crime in the city is down by 27% in the last two years,' 8 over
40% in the last five years, 19 with single digit declines in 1991, 1992,
1993, and accelerating in 1994 and 1995. More importantly, there
are even more significant declines in the homicide and robbery
rates; 39% in homicide, about 30% in robbery.20 These have been
the largest declines in 25 years to the extent that in robbery, we
have fewer robberies now than we had in 1972.21 Homicides, in
New York, have decreased from 2143 in 1990 to slightly under 1200
last year.22 A phenomenal decline in those categories. There are
about 150 of you in this room. Last year we had 750 fewer homicides than the previous year.23 Multiply by five and that is the
number of people who are alive today that might not have been.
On top of that, there were several thousand fewer shooting victims
in the city.24 So we have had a very significant plus. There were
115,000 fewer victims of crime in 1995;25 murders, rapes, robberies,
car thefts, larcenies reported, arguably. Not all crime gets reported; it is significantly under reported. But over time, the
amount of reported crime has remained fairly constant to the point
that we can accurately reflect whether it is up or down. 115,000
fewer victims, 115,000 fewer of you were the victims of violent
crime. But all of you during that time were the victims of another
type of crime. The key to what we are doing in New York City at
this particular juncture, apart from changing the focus of where
community policing is controlled and embracing community policing, is the way in which we are managing the department and responding to the Mayor's goal of a safer city. The key is to place
dual emphasis on serious crime, as well as quality of life or signs of
18. Id.

19. NEW YORK CITY POLICE STATISTICS (Years-end 1990 and 1995) on file with
the New York Police Department [hereinafter POLICE STATISTICS]. These statistics
are collected and maintained under standards set by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Law enforcement agencies across the country collect and maintain crime
statistics uniformly in accordance with these standards for national comparison
studies.
20. Pooley, supra, note 2, at 54.
21. See id.
22. POLICE STATISTICS (Years-end 1990 and 1995).
23. POLICE STATISTICS (Year-end 1995).
24. Id.
25. Id.
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crime. The squeegee pest-the symbolism of doing something
about the squeegee pest. There were only 75 of them, yet the image they were creating, the fear they were generating as people
tried to travel into the city was great. 75 people, 38,000, cops and
the squeegees were winning. Incredible. One of the first things the
Mayor demanded upon election was, "Get rid of them." In as
much as the acts they were committing were illegal, it required a
few summonses, a few arrests, and pretty soon they were gone.
Once in a while, you might see one that still pops up from time to
time, but the department understands more clearly now that not
only do we need to be more focused on reducing real crime, but we
need to be focused, all 38,000 of us, on doing something about
those quality of life signs of crime: the squeegee pests; people urinating in public; people drinking in public; illegal peddling.
All those things make this most complex of American cities, and
indeed rural cities, such a tough place to live-tough in the sense
that there are so many opportunities here and so many pluses in
the city that were being overwhelmed for twenty years by the negatives. What we have now done as a police department is to embrace community policing to work with the other institutions of
government, to be dual focused, and to have goals which are quite
clear: to reduce crime, improve quality of life, and enforce quality
of life offenses for the first time in twenty years.
We have begun to see the difference and we are not doing it
alone. All of the city agencies are involved in cleaning up the graffiti and cleaning up the highways. Next time you are on one of the
highways in the city take a look. There is not too much graffiti
anymore and when it pops up, within a couple days it is painted
over. In most of the city's parks, graffiti is removed within several
days. Many areas of the city are a lot cleaner because of the business improvement districts. There, the private sector is working
with the city for enhanced security, improved lighting and improved cleanliness, particularly here in Manhattan, and certain areas in Brooklyn and Queens. Think of the area down around
Bryant Park and the area right here on Columbus Circle. In 1990,
in Columbus Circle, on any given day there would be 50 or 60 drug
dealers working in and around that area, right adjacent to your
campus. You do not see that anymore. Bryant Park, one of the
drug capitals of the world in the back of the library, is now the site
of a major fight between a restaurant and the fashion industry over
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who gets to occupy that site. 6 It has become a very valuable piece
of real estate again. The city has undergone some very significant
changes. And this police department has undergone some very significant changes. These changes have resulted in the desired impact that the Mayor wanted: reduced crime; improved quality of
life.
We have done it by re-engineering the organization. This is a
term that you hear a lot about, reinventing or re-engineering government. What we have effectively done in the New York City Police Department is taken this very large bureaucracy, this very
large wedding cake, if you will, with all of its levels. Think of it.
Let us go up that little wedding cake from the police officer in a
precinct to me just to give you a sense of how big that bureaucracy
is. The police officer reports to his sergeant, who reports to his
lieutenant, who reports to his captain, who then used to report to
his division commander, who then reported to the borough commander, who then reported to control commander, who then reported to the chief of the department, who then reported to the
deputy commissioner. Then you finally got to me. You can imagine how long, in that bureaucracy, a request going up or down
would take. We were a very centralized, hierarchical organization
in which the Police Commissioner had absolute control. Precinct
commanders had very little authority to do anything unless headquarters demanded it. They were required to have only so many
officers in plain clothes. They were required to have absolutely
only so many officers in cars. They were required to have only so
many officers in different functions. They had no discretion or authority by and large to respond to the changing issues in those 76
very diverse precincts.
Most of you who live in the city recognize that there are no two
precincts in the city which are alike and no two neighborhoods
which are totally alike. The NYPD, for most of its history, attempted to police the city as if it were one entity, police it with very
tight control from headquarters. One of the things that we did, in
re-engineering the department, was decentralize. We pushed the
power down -in the organization, not to the beat cop, as Lee Brown
and Ray Kelly attempted to do with community policing, a system
set up for a failure, but rather to that precinct commander level.
26. See Constance, C.R. White, Patterns, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1995, at B8 ("Micael Einstein, the president of Ark Restaurants has proposed that Seventh on Sixth be
held responsible for any shortfalls of revenue to the Bryant Park Grill that might
occur due to the presence of tents in the park during fall runway shows.")
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To the extent I now have 76 miniature police departments, I expect them to focus on the dual goals to reduce crime and improve
quality of life. And with the expectation, by and large, to respond
to 911 calls. Because we have a pretty good idea of how many we
need on each shift, they are given now a lot more discretion as to
how many people in plain clothes, how many in uniform, how
many on beats, so that they are able to respond to your needsyour concerns-in true partnership. What do you want addressed?
In this precinct here, they want a lot of emphasis on quality of life
because there is not a lot of serious violent crime in this precinct
compared to East New York. There, they want a lot of emphasis
on serious violent crime and shots being fired because that is the
reality, unfortunately, in several of those precincts in East New
York. Precinct commanders now have that discretion. And I
firmly believe that the reason we are seeing such dramatic declines
in crime, is not the weather, is not a lot of the socio-demographic
issues that are being advanced, is not economic issues. These declines may have been impacted somewhat by the higher incarceration rates. But the drop in crime in the city has been so precipitous
over two years. All those factors are longer term, in terms of their
causal relationship. On January 1, 1994, all the young kids in the
City did not suddenly become old, all the criminals did not suddenly march into jail. The weather? Arguably, the blizzard this
year did kind of slow crime down a little bit. Although during the
blizzard, we saw theft in autos go up. The weather did not stop
them from stealing the air bags and computer chips out of cars. It
just stopped them from stealing the cars because they did not want
to shovel them out. But as soon as the snow melted, car thefts
went back up. 1994, if you recall, was the worst winter in many
years. Crime went down. Everybody said it was the weather. The
next year we had the mildest winter in many years, crime went
down even more. Well, maybe it was not the weather. In any
event, we really believe that what has happened in New York City
and what has attracted such national and international attention is
that we have found a better way of policing. We are results-focused, we are decentralized, we are coordinated, and we have
enough cops-38,000 police officers in the City of New York.27
The luxury, the inheritance, if you will, from the David Dinkins era
is that we are benefitting now from that seed that was planted a
27. Pooley, supra note 2, at 54.
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while back. This is one of the causal factors that I think is making a
difference. But more importantly, it is how they are being used.
Prior to 1994, 1995, and now in 1996, uniformed police were not
allowed to make drug arrests for fear of corruption.28 They were
not allowed to deal with a lot of the license premises violations for
fear of corruption. They were not encouraged, for a variety of reasons, to deal with many of the issues which have taken such a hold
on the streets of this city. Now it is expected of them to be out on
those streets, be active, and allow the public to see them taking
charge. It is important that the public should see them dealing with
all of the those issues that infuriated them, causing them to ask,
"why doesn't somebody do something about this?" That has been
controversial and much debated. Many criticize it and are concerned that citizens are being abused in great numbers, or that it
would lead to a change in the flavor of the city. I, for one, have not
seen that yet. I speak out quite frequently in the debate about,
"We have a brutal department, we have a corrupt department, we
have a department that is too assertive." I am comfortable speaking on behalf of the department. I am very comfortable speaking
in support of it. I am also very comfortable speaking about the
115,000 fewer victims of crime that department has been able to
help generate.
So, that is where we are. That is really a walk through time.
There were very significant changes in policing from the reactive to
a much more proactive community policing model in this city. The
formula of a political will to take the streets back, enough police
resources used very appropriately, focused on real crime and quality of life. We think we have, in some respects, found the right mix
that will do two things: continue to reduce crime and, as importantly, keep it down. Crime now in the city is down about 40%
from what it was in 1990.29 Some categories higher, some lower,
but on the average about 40%. The goal for 1996 is another 10%
so that we will have had a 50% reduction. Consider the psychological impact of that and the image it projects of this city. TWo years
ago, this city on a per capita basis, per 100,000 population was
rated, among the 180 largest cities, 116th in terms of overall
28. See generally Joseph McNamara, Devastating Cost of Drug War, THE DES

Feb. 11, 1996, at 1 ("Police scandals are an untallied cost of the
drug war.... The gravity of the police crimes is as disturbing as the volume." The
article goes on to describe various drug-related corruption arrests of police officers in
New Orleans, Washington D.C., Atlanta and New York.).
29. POLICE STATISTICS (Years-end 1990 and 1995).
MOINES REGISTER,
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crime. 30 This means even two years ago, there were 115 American
cities that had more crime per capita than New York. Now, we are
down to 136 over the last two years and I anticipate at the end of
1996, we will be beyond 150. This might seem strange when you
pick up the papers everyday and you see these horrific actions. But
keep in mind how many of us there are. There are 7.5 million who
live in the city, 31 3 million more who come in to work here everyday, and 26 million tourists. 32 There is always going to be, unfortunately, the crime of the day, the crime that is going to make the
front page. But the reality is there are many more of you who are
not the victims of crime, serious crime, than there were several
years ago and the good news is we think we can continue to keep
getting it down to at least that 50% reduction level.
Additionally, this year, as you may have heard, the Mayor has
committed to even more aggressively attacking the drug problem
in the City. We have been mandated by the Mayor to put together
probably one of the most comprehensive assaults on the drug problem ever waged by any American Police Department. We benefit
in New York from a very large police department, so I can throw a
lot of resources at it. We will be identifying a major area of the city
to go in, with about 1400 additional officers, and take that area
back. Drug-related crime in the city is still what is generating the
random violence, the fear, and a lot of the death toll. Many people
live in this city in relative safety, but too many live in abject fear
because their neighborhoods are still not safe and are still victimized by too much crime. We are going to commit ourselves this
year, as a Department, to see if we can do even more. We will not
sit back and rest on our laurels, but see if can we do even more.
We are not talking about doing it here in Manhattan, we are talking about doing it in some of the toughest neighborhoods in the
city. We will go where the problems are. We will not do it as an
occupying army, but in partnership, to work with those communities, to understand that to rid those neighborhoods, we must be
there in very large numbers, and we must be there assertively. But
we need to do it with their support and their cooperation and their
understanding. So we will be spending a lot of time working with
those designated neighborhoods to work with us and not feel that
we are working against them.
30. Information provided by the New York Police Department, Bureau of Public

Relations.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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So it has been a good-news couple of years. It has not been without problems, though. The issue of corruption was, unfortunately,
in this department, a major problem as evidenced by the Mollen
Commission Report.33 I spent a great deal of my first year on that
issue, as did my predecessors. The good news is that what was not
known when the Mollen Commission was first put together-the
extent of corruption-is known now. The Mollen Commission's
principal service was that it identified the extent of corruption in
the Department and caused significant changes in the way we police ourselves. As Police Commissioner, now, I feel I have a very
good idea of the extent of it, but more importantly, the ability to
control it. Like crime, police crime is never going to go away totally. I have 38,000 cops. They are risk-takers by nature. Some of
them are not good people. They are in a profession where there
are phenomenal temptations, and many of them go over the line.
Yet, now I can comfortably say to you that we do not have rogue
precincts like the 30th and the 48th. I do have rogue officers, but
increasingly their numbers are being minimized and increasingly
we are getting more efficient at finding them out ourselves, arresting them, and putting them in jail. But the reality is, you are still
going to hear from time to time of those types of corruption arrests. In the same way, no matter how good we are, you will still
hear about horrendous crimes, whether it is the massacre up in
Harlem 34 or the shooting massacre up in the Bronx.3 That is part
of the American scene, unfortunately. The best we can do is try to
prevent as much of that as possible. I think that, fortunately, in
this City, we have been able to prevent an awful lot of it working
together with you.
So with that, I would like to bring my comments to a close and
open the discussion up for whatever questions, comments or critiques you might have. I believe we have brought some materials
that reinforce some of my comments. Materials such as Managing
for Results which explains more in detail the intimacies of what we
have done over the last couple of years. I have really only given
you an overview. It is a very large topic area to cover in a 20-30
minute time frame. But certainly one that is of critical importance
33. For excerpts from the report, see Corruptionin Uniform; Excerpts of What the
Commission Found: Loyalty Over Integrity, N. Y. TIMES, July 7, 1994, at B2.
34. See John Kifner, Death on 125th Street; The Overview: Gunman and 7 Others

Die in Blaze at Harlem Store, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1995, at 1.
35. See Wendall Jamieson et. al, Shoe Store Slaughter Shooter Kills 5, Wounds 3,
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 20, 1995, at 3.
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to each and every one of you in this room. It is my pleasure to
have had the opportunity to come in and talk about something that
I thoroughly enjoy working on-improving our safety.

